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Muslim Brides and the Ghost of the Shari’a: Have
the Recent Law Reforms in Egypt, Tunisia and
Morocco Improved Women’s Position in
Marriage and Divorce, and Can Religious
Moderates Bring Reform and Make It Stick?
Yakaré-Oulé Jansen*
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

Upon gaining independence, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia all started a process of
law reform in the area of family law. 1 This resulted in a number of laws relating to family
matters adopted in Egypt between the 1920’s and 1950’s. 2 Morocco and Tunisia adopted
a Code of Personal Status in 1957-1958 and 1956 respectively. 3 Although Western law
replaced shari’a in most areas, family law has remained the domain of traditional Islamic
law. 4 This partly has to do with the central position the family has in the life of a Muslim,
partly with tradition, and perhaps to a certain extent with resisting the influence of
European legal systems and a recent reinforcement of religious fundamentalist voices. 5
All three countries have recently undergone significant law reforms, to which Tunisia is
somewhat of an exception as it began with a fairly progressive legal framework. 6 The
aim of this article is to assess to what extent these law reforms have improved the
position of women in family law, in particular women’s rights related to entering into
marriage, the obligations during marriage and the ability to obtain divorce.
In order to place the respective legislations in the proper context, this article first
discusses the rules on marriage and divorce as prescribed by the Qur’an and sunna and
how they compare to the rules in pre-Islamic Arabia. Naturally, the surve y cannot amount
to more than a general discussion, as examining the various views of the different schools
* LL.M., Columbia University School of Law, 2006; Meester in de Rechten (J.D./LL.B. equiv.) Dutch
Civil Law, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2005; Meester in de Rechten (J.D./LL.B. equiv.)
International & European Law, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2005.
1
J. N. D. Anderson, Modern Trends in Islam Legal Reform and Modernisation in the Middle East, 20 INT ’L
& COMP . L.Q. 1, 1-21 (1971).
2
Michele Brandt & Jeffrey A. Kaplan, The Tension Between Women’s Rights and Religious Rights:
Reservations to CEDAW by Egypt, Bangladesh and Tunisia, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 105, 111-13 (1995-1996).
3
Brandt & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 128-31; Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Reform of Personal Status Laws in
North Africa: A Problem of Islamic or Mediterranean Laws?, 49 M IDDLE E. J., 432, 432-46 (1995);
M OUNIRA M. CHARRAD, STATES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS: THE M AKING OF POSTCOLONIAL TUNISIA,
A LGERIA AND M OROCCO 158-68, 215-32 (2001).
4
Anderson, Modern Trends, supra note 1, at 1.
5
Brandt & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 132.
6
Brandt & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 128-31; CHARRAD, supra note 3, at 230; Nadia Hijab, Islam, Social
Change and the Reality of Arab Women’s Lives, in ISLAM, GENDER, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 45, 46-47
(Yvonne Y. Haddad & John L. Esposito eds., 1998).
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of jurisprudence would amount to much too lengthy an expedition. Before looking into
the reforms that have taken place in each country, a brief survey is presented on the
position of women under the respective constitutions as well as the obligations with
respect to family law under the major international human rights treaties. This is
followed by a discussion of the reforms in the area of marriage and divorce and some
comments on the possibility that reform on paper need not necessarily imply a change in
day to day reality.
II. THE RELIGIOUS CONTEXT
A. The Position of Women in the Qur’an
¶3

¶4

The Qur’an introduced a great improvement of the position of women as opposed
to the situation in pre-Islamic Arabia. 7 Although pre-Islamic poetry and some other
sources point to the occurrence of women who owned property, conducted business and
independently arranged their own marriage, 8 such as Muhammad’s first wife Khadijah,
women were generally placed under the control of a father or husband. 9 Under preIslamic society, when married, a woman became the property of her husband and so did
the children she would bear him. 10 In exchange, her tribe would be paid a dower the price
of which depended upon a woman’s virtue and chastity. 11 By marrying, the woman
forfeited all inheritance rights within her own family which ensured that property could
not be transferred outside the tribe. 12 She did, however, maintain the right to protection by
her blood relatives in case her husband mistreated her. 13 Polygamy was unlimited and
divorce did not entail any maintenance obligations. 14
The advent of Islam brought a shift in focus from the tribe as most important social
unit to the family as the foundation of society. 15 Women were held to be equally
responsible in preserving the family unit as men and therefore this shift entailed
acknowledgement of their rights. 16 An important change was that women now received
their dower themselves, and not their father or other male relatives, changing women’s
position from subject of the marriage contract to that of a legal partner. 17 Polygamy was
limited to a maximum of four wives, provided the husband was able to treat each wife in
an equal manner. 18 Divorce had to be followed by a waiting period in which
reconciliation was possible and if that did not occur, provisions for maintenance could be

7

JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN M USLIM FAMILY LAW 12-14 (2001).
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 13.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 14.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 23.
18
Qur’an 4:3 (“ [M]arry women of your choice, two, or three, or four; but if [you] fear that [you] shall not
be able to deal justly (with them), then only one […]”). A BDULLAH YUSUF A LI, AN ENGLISH
INTERPRETATION OF THE HOLY QUR’AN (2001).
8
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made. 19 Quranic inheritance rules allotted fixed shares of the property to designated heirs,
including women who were excluded under the pre-Islamic system. 20
Giving women full legal capacity to enter into civil transactions and to own
property irrespective of their married status was a progressive step compared to the
European-Christian21 laws, which until last century failed to give women their equal share
of rights. 22 For example, up to the 1960’s and 1970’s when the European codes were
adjusted to fit modern time reality, French women needed permission from their husband
to go to work. 23 The Qur’an and the Islamic codes, discussed later on, may to some
extent have lost their progressive edge since the Western codes developed further;
however, what is currently considered to be the standard is the result of much more recent
developments than is generally appreciated. 24
The distinction Islamic culture makes between men and women is generally taken
as a given. 25 The compatibility between the condemnation of discrimination against
women and the acknowledgement of certain (biological) differences is based on a
classification on the basis of sex, stemming from what is considered men’s greater
responsibilities as providers and protectors in society. 26 This may be understandable
within a historical context, but it remains questionable whether this rationale can be
applied with as much ease in modern day society. 27 In addition, such classifications can
have a detrimental discriminating effect on women’s position within society. 28

19

ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 25.
Id. at 37-38.
21
The Qur’an addresses men and women equally when speaking of their rights, duties and obligations,
while underlining that they are different by nature. The story of Creation is told in gender-neutral terms and
the principle of equality often emphasized: “Never will I suffer to be lost the work of any of you, be he
male or female: [you] are members, one of another […],” Qur’an 3:195, and “to men is allotted what they
earn, and to women what they earn [..],” Qur’an 4:32. The fourth sura of the Qur’an, the alNisa’, forms a
special tribute to the particular rights and obligations of women. The New Testament takes a different
approach, erasing the (sexual) difference between men and women: “There is […] neither slave nor free
man, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus.” Galatians 3:28, New A MERICAN
STANDARD BIBLE (1995). An interesting connection can be made here with the ideal of celibacy within
Christian religious culture, whereas celibacy is not encouraged Islam. See Mohammad Al-Moqatei, The
Philosophy of Marriage in Islam 7 (Univ. of Warwick, Coventry, Working Paper, 1985).
22
THE REFORM OF FAMILY LAw IN EUROPE (A.G. Chloros ed., 1978).
23
See generally Jacques Foyer, The Reform of Family Law in France, in THE REFORM OF FAMILY LAW IN
EUROPE, supra note 22, at 75-109. For an interesting reflection on the development of family law in North
Africa and France, see Mayer, supra note 3.
24
See generally THE REFORM OF FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE, supra note 22.
25
See generally LEILA AHMED, WOMEN AND GENDER IN ISLAM (1992).
26
See ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 132-34.
27
With the increasing participation of women in the workforce as well as in politics, the traditional division
of labor in which the man is the breadwinner and the woman takes care of the household can no longer be
considered universally applicable.
28
According to Amina Wadud, it is mistaken to read any general preference of men over women into the
verses of the Qur’an. She argues that some verses have been repeatedly misinterpreted as stating an overall
supremacy of man over woman, including verses on divorce (Qur’an 2:228, for example, which, according
to Wadud, only provides an advantage to men over women with regard to divorce, not in general) and
verses on the duties between husband and wife (Qur’an 4:34, for example, which is taken as allotting a
double share of inheritance to men consequent to their responsibility to maintain women). See A MINA
W ADUD , QUR’AN AND WOMEN 66-74, 105 (1999).
20
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B. Marriage
¶7

¶8

Islam is a way of life, which regulates the personal, spiritual as well as the physical
and social aspects of everyday life. 29 Marriage is recommended by the Prophet
Muhammad and described by him as the ‘perfection’ of one’s religion; 30 yet it is not a
sacrament under Islamic law. 31 Marriage is a civil contract, legitimizing intercourse and
procreation. 32 It is a contract with a high spiritual content, an obligation any good Muslim
not financially or physically impaired should fulfill. 33 Moreover, as briefly mentioned in
the preceding paragraph, “[M]arriage, in Islam, is truly the foundation for the family;
and, the family, in turn, is truly the foundation for the Islamic social system.”34 According
to Islamic law scholar Mahmoud Hoballah, there are many legitimate reasons to get
married 35 but the most commonly referred to reason in the Qur’an is ’peace of mind’,
‘ease of mind’ or ‘tranquility and quietude in the other.’ 36
A marriage contract must satisfy certain requirements in order to be valid. 37 First,
the contracting parties must be of sound mind and free to act. There is no mention of an
age suitable for marriage in the Qur’an, but under classical Islamic law, men are assumed
to have attained puberty at the age of 12 and women at the age of 9. 38 Men may contract
their own marriage; women must typically have a guardian to act on their behalf. 39 An
exception to this rule is the Hanafi40 school, which allows an adult woman to contract her

29

Mahmoud Hoballah, Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance in Islamic Law, 22 GEO. W ASH. L. REV. 24, 24
(1953-1954).
30
Id. at 24-25; A l-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 1.
31
Islamic law or shari’a indicates the legal rules drawn from the Qur’an (the primary source of Islamic
guidance, the word of God as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad), the sunna (the life examples and
traditions by the Prophet), qiyas (the process of analogical reasoning allowing for Quranic guidance in
situations for which the Qur’an had not explicitly provided guidance) and ijma (the consensus of religious
leaders).
32
“Celibacy is frowned upon in Islam. […] The Islamic philosophy of marriage is that marriage is a natural
way of life and the most sacred institution of Islam. The religion is against celibacy and monastic life and
considers parenthood the duty of every human being. God creates animal life and gave the instincts with
which they can continue the species. […] Not only is marriage a means of sensual enjoyment but it is also a
commitment to life itself, to society and the means for survival of the human race.” A l-Moqatei, supra note
21, at 7, 13.
33

See id.; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 14.
Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 1.
35
Hoballah, supra note 29, at 26 (”Marriage may be contracted for one or all of the following purposes: the
propagation of the human race; the unification of different people so as to create between them a bond of
relationship which is not less if not more important than that of blood relationship; to cherish in man and
woman a sense of responsibility which is particularly essential for human stability and progress; to develop
in man and woman the feeling of respect and love, and to keep the character of both man and woman pure
and clean.”).
36
Id.
37
Id. at 25.
38
ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 15.
39
Id.
40
The Hanafi school of thought was founded by Imam Abu Hanifa in the eight century A.D. The school
often favors the position of men in matters of divorce and does not easily allow for additional clauses in the
marriage contract. There are three other schools of fiqh (jurisprudence) within Sunni Islam: the Maliki,
Hanbali and Shafi’i schools, founded in the eighth and ninth century A.D. by Imams Malik ibn Anas,
Ahmad bin Hanbal and Muhammad bin Idris al-Shafi'i, respectively. They offer varying degrees of
flexibility with respect to the insertion of clauses in the marriage contract and grounds for divorce.
Generally, the Shafi’i school is considered the most conservative.
34
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own marriage, provided this is with a man of equal social status. 41 According to some
Hanafi jurists, failure to demand a proper dower or the husband’s negligence in paying it
allows for the guardian to have the marriage dissolved. 42
¶9
Second, there should be no impediment of relationship or religion which would
interdict marriage between the parties. Under Hanafi law, a man may marry either a
Muslim woman or a scriptural non-Muslim woman, meaning that she can be either
Jewish or Christian. 43 She can continue to practice her religion. Aside from religious
difference, certain degrees of kinship bar a valid marriage as well. 44
¶10
Third, the contract may not be limited in time. 45 In pre-Islamic Arabia it was
possible to conclude temporary marriages (mutah), but within the context of Islam,
marriage is intended as a permanent institution. 46
¶11
Fourth, the essential offer (ijab) by the one party and acceptance (qabul) by the
other must take place before at least two male witnesses. 47 An engagement is not legally
binding and can be broken off without any legal implications, although from an Islamic
point of view a promise made is a moral obligation and should be fulfilled. 48
¶12
Finally, the wife must be given a dower. 49 The purpose of the dower is to safeguard
the economic position of the wife after marriage “so that she is not prevented for lack of
money from defending her rights.”50 The dower is an essential element of the contract; a
marriage contract that stipulates the absence of a dowry is not valid. 51 The dower is the
41

ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 15, 21 (stating that equality is determined by family, Islam, profession,
freedom, good character and means).
42
Id.
43
ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 19. According to Al-Moqatei, a Muslim woman cannot marry a non-Muslim
under any circumstances. Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 12.
44
One cannot marry an ascendant or a descendant, or a brother or sister or their descendants. It does not
matter whether these brothers and sisters are sanguine or half-brothers and –sisters. One also cannot marry
the brothers or sisters of one’s ascendants, a mother- or father-in -law, stepson or –daughter or a foster
father or mother. Also, it is prohibited to have as co-wives women who are sisters or who would otherwise
be prohibited from marrying if one of them were male. Qur’an 4:23; Hoballah, supra note 29, at 26;
ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 19-20.
45
Hoballah, supra note 29, at 25.
46
Shiite jurists disagree and do not consider the temporary marriage to be forbidden (haram). See, e.g.,
Temporary Marriage in Islamic Law, http://www.al-islam.org/al-serat/muta (last visited Apr. 2, 2007).
47
One male witness can be replaced by two female witnesses: “And get two witnesses, out of your own
men. And if there are not two men, then a man and two women, such as [you] choose for witnesses, so that
if one of them errs, the other can remind her.” Qur’an 2:282. The justification for this “two women for one
man” rule is that due to the strict division of labor in traditional Islamic society, women, who were
confined to domestic matters, were considered to lack the worldly savvy and experience of men and
therefore less competent to bear witness. ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 16 and 47. Even if applicable to
matters of business, this rule appears questionable when it comes to matters such as marriage; considering
women’s focus on household, family and the domestic domain, one could argue that they would be the
witness par excellence for such occasions. Wadud interprets the passage more positively in the context of
the time of revelation of the Qur’an, and points out that “[e]ven at the time of severe social, financial, and
experiential constraints, the Qur’an recognized the potential of women’s resources.” W ADUD, supra note
28, at 86. “Despite the social constraints, [. . .] a woman was nevertheless considered a potential witness.”
Id.
48
Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 9.
49
Hoballah, supra note 29, at 25, ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 23.
50
Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 10.
51
This does not mean that when the dowry is not mentioned or a man does not pay the dower in time, the
marriage contract is void. See Hoballah, supra note 29, at 25. The wife maintains the right to claim her
dower and he remains under obligation to pay it. Id. If no dower is mentioned or determined, she can claim
the dowry of a woman of equal position and he will be obliged to pay accordingly. Id. Also, different types
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wife’s personal property. 52 She is not required to share or use it to contribute to the
household, but she may do so if she chooses. 53
¶13
The number of marriages a person can enter into is limited. 54 Polyandry (several
husbands for one woman) is not allowed under Islamic law, polygyny (several wives for
one husband) is. 55 Hereinafter the more commonly used term “polygamy” will be used.
Polygamy is limited to a maximum of four wives, provided that the husband is capable of
treating all wives equally, both in provisions and in kindness. 56 The possibility of having
several wives regulated an existing practice under pre-Islamic customary law, 57 and was
originally intended to solve certain social problems, such as the care for widows and
orphans after the death of many men in warfare. 58 Although it is stated to not have been
intended for “the satisfaction of anyone’s sexual desires,”59 some authors appear to
coincidentally see it as the perfect solution for venereal disease and adultery. 60
C. Rights and Obligations in Marriage
¶14

According to the Qur’an, women “have rights similar to the [husbands’] rights
against them.”61 The wife’s rights are considered the counterpart of the husband’s
obligation of maintenance. 62 This obligation of maintenance entails both material aspects,
such as adequate housing, clothing and food as well as a right to general care and wellbeing. 63 In addition to the previously discussed right to a dower, the woman can secure
certain further rights by means of stipulations in the marriage contract under Hanbali
law. 64 This can be done at the moment of its conclusion or afterwards. 65 These
of dowers can be agreed upon, either prompt or deferred. See A l-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 11.
52
See Qur’an 4:4: “And give the women (on marriage) their dower as an obligation; but if they, of their
own good pleasure, remit any part of it to you, take it and enjoy it with right good cheer.”
53
Id. M. Abu Zahra, Family Law, in LAW IN THE M IDDLE EAST 132, 142-43 (M. Khadduri & H. Liebesny
eds., 1955); Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 11.
54
Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 17; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 19.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
See supra Part II.A and II.B.
58
Relevant at the time was the Battle of Uhud in 625 A.D., which caused the death of a great percentage of
Muslim men, leaving an accordingly great number of widows and orphans. Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at
16.
59
Hoballah, supra note 29, at 27.
60
Al-Moqatei, supra note 21,at 14: “[P]olygamy is one of the most important [principles] in Islamic law,
because [it] solves very comp licated social problems . . . Whereas most of the societies of today are
suffering from adultery and veneral [sic] disease and cannot find solutions for these problems, no such
problems exist in Islam. Modern societies still have a problem even if they use the “boyfriend and
girlfriend” or fiancée relationship. There is also the problem in monogamous societies where there is
adultery in the case of men deceiving their wives with sweethearts.”
61
Qur’an 2:228. However, the same verse states that “men have a degree over them.” Id. See also supra
notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
62
See Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 11.
63
Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 11; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 25.
64
ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 22. The practical use of this option may be limited if it is not the woman
herself who contracts the marriage. She may either be too young and inexperienced to grasp the scope of
her duties under marriage or the person negotiating the contract for her may not want to pay attention to
any wishes she may express on this matter. Amending the contract at a later stage would require the
consent of both parties, which may be difficult. Thus, what may seem to be an equitable arrangement in
principle may not be so in practice due to inequality in bargaining power.
65
Id.

186

Vol. 5:2]

Yakaré-Oulé Jansen

stipulations could include the prohibition of the man to take a second wife or the right of
the woman to work outside the home. 66 The only condition is that they are not contrary to
the object of marriage. 67 Such clauses are void, but leave the marriage contract itself
intact. 68 As mentioned before, the Qur’an enabled women to own property69 and neither
partner acquires a right in the spouse’s property upon marriage. 70
¶15
In return for the husband’s obligation to maintenance, the wife has the obligation to
maintain a good household, care for the children and be faithful and obedient to her
husband. 71 The husband is allowed to restrict his wife’s liberty of movement (for as far as
his freedom to do so has not been limited by stipulations in the marriage contract) and to
determine which visitors she may and may not receive. 72 She must maintain an attractive
appearance for him and may not “deny herself to her husband.”73
D. Divorce
¶16

Muhammad is reported to have said that “of all permitted things, divorce is the
most abominable with God.”74 But, as marriage is a contract and the forced cohabitation
of two people who cannot live together in harmony would be even more harmful to these
individuals, as well as to the purpose of marriage within society as such, there are ways
of dissolving a failed marriage under Islamic law. 75 Divorce is not to be resolved upon
until all attempts to reconciliation have been made. 76 To this end, a window of
opportunity for the partners to reconcile is left during a certain period of time. 77
¶17
Even though the Qur’an repeatedly makes clear that divorce is reprehensible and
against the will of God, divorce can be sought when a couple can no longer live together
as husband and wife. 78 This is a very broad definition, leaving it open to the interpretation
of jurists to define what type of marital discord could be grounds for divorce. 79 The
pronouncement of talaq (repudiation) by the husband must indicate an intention to
divorce, along the lines of “you are divorced” or “I have divorced you.”80 The actual
intent does not necessarily have to agree with the verbal meaning. 81

66

Id.
Id. Thus, a party may not contract around the obligation of a husband to maintain his wife. Id.
68
Abu Zahra, supra note 53, at 139-40; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 22-23.
69
See Qur’an 4:7: “From what is left by parents and those nearest related there is a share for men and a
share for women, whether the property be small or large, — a determinate share.”
70
Abu Zahra, supra note 53, at 140; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 23.
71
See Courtney W. Howland, The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism to the Liberty and Equality
Rights of Women: An Analysis under the United Nations Charter, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT ’L L. 271, 282324 (1997). A wife’s mandatory obedience to her husband is a doctrine common to fundamentalism in all
five major religions: Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam and Judaism. Id.
72
ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 22.
73
Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 12.
74
ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 27.
75
Abu Zahra, supra note 53, at 145; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 28.
76
Hoballah, supra note 29, at 27.
77
ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 30.
78
Hoballah, supra note 29, at 27.
79
Id. at 28.
80
ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 29.
81
Id.
67
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¶18

The talaq can be either revocable, which would allow a husband to reconcile with
his wife, or irrevocable, which means that certain conditions need to be fulfilled before
reconciliation is possible. 82 A man can divorce his wife and reconcile with her two times;
the third divorce becomes irrevocable and the man can only marry his ex-wife again after
she has remarried, consummated the marriage and then was legally divorced or became a
widow. 83 The idea is that this will prevent the man from divorcing his wife frivolously
and was a response to the pre-Islam practices in Arabia in which the repeated divorcing
and remarrying of wives was used to push women into buying their final freedom by
relinquishing their dower. 84 Talaq pronounced before the marriage was consummated is
irrevocable as well. 85
¶19
A revocable divorce remains so only for a specific period of time, the iddah. 86 The
purpose of the iddah is to allow for reconciliation and to ascertain whether the wife is
pregnant or not. 87 If the marriage was consummated, this period will take the time of
three menstrual cycles. 88 If she is pregnant, the iddah continues until she gives birth. 89
The declaration of talaq should be made only during the period of thur, the time when the
woman is not menstruating, and is valid only if a husband has not had sexual relations
with his wife. 90
¶20
The form of divorce in which talaq is uttered three consecutive times in order to
become irrevocable is disapproved. 91 “I divorce you; I divorce you; I divorce you” goes
against Quranic prescriptions, 92 but the only safeguard or restriction provided for its use
is the man’s conscience and God’s punishment in the hereafter. 93
¶21
The Qur’an confers basic rights of divorce upon the wife as well, but in practice
her ability to obtain one is very limited. 94 One option is the delegated divorce, or talaq altafwid, in which the woman is delegated the power to divorce by her husband (“divorce
yourself”). 95 Another option is to have the marriage dissolved by a judge upon petition by
the wife. 96 In contrast to the husband, who is not required to state any grounds fo r his
decision to divorce, Muslim jurists allow the wife to file her petition only in limited

82

Qur’an 2:229 (“A divorce is only permis sible twice; after that, the parties should either hold together on
equitable terms, or separate with kindness.”); ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 31, 37.
83
See Qur’an 2:229 and 2:230 (“So if a husband divorces his wife (irrevocably), he cannot, after that, remarry her until after she has married another husband and he has divorced her.”); see also Abu Zahra,
supra note 53, at 148; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 37.
84
See Qur’an 2:229; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 31; Hoballah, supra note 29, at 29.
85
Abu Zahra, supra note 53, at 147-48.
86
See Qur’an 2:228, ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 30.
87
ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 20, 34.
88
“Such of your women as have passed the age of monthly courses, for them the prescribed period, if [you]
have any doubts, is three months, and for those who have no courses (it is the same): for those who are
pregnant, their period is until they deliver their burdens […].” Qur’an 65:4.
89
Id.
90
Abu Zahra, supra note 53, at 147; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 30-31.
91
ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 31.
92
“When [you] do divorce women, divorce them at their prescribed periods, and count (accurately) their
prescribed periods: and fear Allah your Lord: and turn them not out of your houses […].” Qur’an 65:1.
93
Id.; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 31.
94
See Qur’an 2:228.
95
This authorization could have been given at the time of conclusion of the marriage contract, or later on
during the marriage. See Abu Zahra, supra note 53, at 146.
96
Id.
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circumstances. 97 There is no consensus among the Sunni schools of jurisprudence on
which specific grounds have to be submitted. 98 The most liberal is the Maliki99 school,
allowing divorce on the grounds of cruelty, refusal of maintenance, desertion or a serious
disease or ailment on the husband’s side that would be potentially harmful to the wife. 100
The most restrictive is the Hanafi school, which allows divorce only on grounds of
physical defects, 101 and the absence or incapacity of the man to consummate the
marriage. 102 One should note here in particular that under the Hanafi school
noncompliance with the main duty of the husband in marriage—maintaining his wife—is
not mentioned as grounds for divorce. 103
¶22
Divorce by mutual consent is possible at the wife’s instigation if she is able to buy
her freedom. 104 She can do so by paying her husband a sum of money, or by
relinquishing part (or all) of the dower that has not yet been paid. 105 This payment is not
prescribed, the Qur’an even explicitly forbids men from pushing their wives into divorce
by treating them badly and thus getting back some of the dower. 106 Mutual divorce on
instigation of both husband and wife is possible as well. 107 The man then proposes
dissolution and the woman accepts it. 108 This type of divorce is irrevocable. 109
¶23
Finally, pursuant to the Hanafi teachings, when a woman renounces Islam and
converts to another religion, the bond of marriage is dissolved automatically. 110 For
women lacking the means to redeem themselves from an undesirable marriage and the
possibility to have their marriage annulled by a judge, this can be the last resort. 111

97

ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 33-34.
See id. at 35.
99
The Malik school of thought is generally considered to be quite progressive in the area of divorce. When
it comes to marriage on the other hand, women may have their marriages arranged against their consent,
even as adults, unless they have been married once before. See id. at 33-34.
100
Id.
101
According to the Hanafi school, the marriage can be irregular for a number of reasons, such as the
conclusion of a marriage with a new wife when the former one is still in her period of iddah. Id. Other
grounds for divorce recognized by the Hanafi school are if the parties are prohibited from marriage by
fosterage, the marriage was contracted by non-Muslims who subsequently adopted Islam, or Muslims who
subsequently forsake the Islamic religion, or the mere exercise of the option of dissolution by a party
capable of doing so. Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. Hanafi jurists do say that a husband can be compelled to pay maintenance or even be imprisoned if
he continues his refusal.
104
“It is not lawful for you, (men), to take back any of your gifts (from your wives), except when both
parties fear that they would be unable to keep the limits ordained by Allah if [you] (judges) do indeed fear
that they would be unable to keep the limits […], there is no blame on either of them if she give something
for her freedom […].” Qur’an 2:229. See also ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 32; Hoballah, supra note 29, at
29.
105
See Hoballah, supra note 29, at 29.
106
See Qur’an 4:19 (“Nor should [you] treat them with harshness, that [you] may take away part of the
dower [you] have given them […]”).
107
ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 32.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 34.
111
Id. at 34, 79.
98
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E. Consequences of Divorce
As previously mentioned, 112 husband and wife do not obtain a legal interest in the
other person’s property upon marriage, so each party leaves with their pre- marital
property. 113 Whether or not the wife keeps her dower after divorce depends mainly on
whether the marriage has been consummated. 114 If the marriage was not consummated,
she may receive part of the dower or a “suitable gift”. 115 When the marriage has been
consummated, she is to keep her dower irrespective of who instigated the divorce. 116 The
wife also has a right to maintenance during the period of iddah. 117 If she is pregnant, her
maintenance rights continue until childbirth. 118 When the wife has a young child, the
father must maintain both her and the child during the two years that she is nursing. 119
¶25
Children are generally considered to be better off with their mothers until males are
seven years old and females are nine years old. 120 According to the Hanafi school, the
children, regardless of age, should go to the family of the father if the woman remarries,
displays “immoral” behavior, or takes care of the child in a poor manner. 121 A prominent
scholar, John Esposito, points out that the family emphasizes the paternal line of ancestry,
thus the children “belong” more to the father than to the mother. 122 This leaves women,
“whose roles of wife and mother [are] the main source of a woman’s status in a
traditional society” at risk of having their children taken away from them “even though
[they were given] no choice in the divorce action.”123
¶24

III. THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
¶26

In order to provide a legal context in which to place the comparison of the current
and former laws of personal status, this article will first briefly discuss the constitutions
of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia as well as these countries’ obligations under international
law. This is not intended as a comprehensive discussion of all relevant issues; this section
is focused on aspects related to religion and equality for men and women within the
respective constitutions as well as the obligations pertaining to equality and the family as
codified in the most important human rights treaties. 124 In particular the issues of
112

See supra Part II.A and II.B.
Abu Zahra, supra note 53, at 140; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 23.
114
See Qur’an 2:236 and 2: 237 (“There is no blame on you if [you] divorce women before consummation
or the fixation of their dower; but bestow on them (a suitable gift), the wealthy according to his means, and
the poor according to his means [...] And if [you] divorce them before consummation, but after the fixation
of a dower for them, then the half of the dower (is due to them), unless they remit it [...]”); ESPOSITO, supra
note 7, at 35.
115
Qur’an 2:236 and 2: 237; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 35.
116
ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 35.
117
See Qur’an 2:233; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 36.
118
ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 36.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 35.
121
Id. at 36.
122
Id. at 36. This is also why under Islamic law children cannot take on the nationality of their mother, if
different from the father.
123
Id.
124
See, e.g., the U.N. Charter (1945), available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/; The International
Bill of Human Rights (1948), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs2.htm (consisting of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
113

190

Vol. 5:2]

Yakaré-Oulé Jansen

international human rights and Islamic law as well as the permissibility of reservations to
human rights treaties could call for a far more extensive discussion than is provided
here. 125 But as this will quickly lead us into the heart of a cultural relativism discourse
and the aim of this article is to provide an analysis of the recent law reforms, this article
will not digress too much on the topic.
A. The Constitutions
¶27

Egypt adopted its first constitution in 1923 and revised it in 1971, 1980 and 2005.126
Article 2 of the constitution declares that Islam is the State religion and Islamic
jurisprudence the principal source of legislation. 127 Of all three constitutions, the Egyptian
constitution is the only one that mentions both equality and family life. 128 The principle of
equality is first mentioned in article 8, in which equal opportunity for all citizens is
guaranteed by the State. 129 Article 40 declares all citizens equal before the law, bearing
equal pub lic rights and duties without discrimination on grounds of sex, ethnic origin,
language, religion or creed. 130 The Egyptian family as “the basis of the society founded
on religion, morality and patriotism” is described in article 9 of the constitution. 131 Under
article 11 the Egyptian State is to guarantee a proper coordination of a woman’s duty
towards her family and her duties towards society. 132 In the fields of political, social,
(ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)); The United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) G.A.
Res. 180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Sept. 3, 1981), available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm [hereinafter CEDAW].
125
See Azizah al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women’s Rights, 12 A M U.J. INT ’L L.
& POL’Y 1 (1997); Joelle Entelis, International Human Rights: Islam’s Friend of Foe?, 20 FORDHAM INT ’L
L. J. 1251 (1997); Mashmood A. Baderin, Human Rights and Islamic Law: The Myth of Discord, 2 EUR .
HUM. RTS. L.R. 165 (2005) (discussing the compatibility of Islamic law with international human rights);
see Bassam Tibi, Islamic Law/ Shari’a, Human Rights, Universal Morality and International Relations, 16
HUM. RTS. Q. 277 (1994); Christina M. Cerna, Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity:
Implementing Human Rights in Different Socio-Cultural Contexts, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 740 (1994); Heiner
Bielefeldt, Muslim Voices in the Human Rights Debate, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 587, 601 (1995); Reza Afshari,
An Essay on Islamic Cultural Relativism in the Discourse of Human Rights, 16 Hum. Rts. Q. 235 (1994)
(discussing the incompatibility or need to redefine human rights doctrine within the Islamic framework);
see also infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text (discussing the permissibility of reservations with
respect to treaties).
126
Egypt State Information Service, Political System,
http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Pub/yearbook/yearbook2005/110103000000000019.htm (last visited Feb. 17,
2007).
127
DUSTUR JUMHURIYYAT M ISR A L-A RABIYYA [Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt], ch. 1, art. 2,
available at http://www.egypt.gov.eg/english/laws/constitution/index.asp (English translation) [hereinafter
EGYPT CONST .].
128
Id. at ch. 2, arts. 8-9 and ch. 3, art. 40.
129
Id. at ch. 2, art. 8 (“The State shall guarantee equality of opportunity to all citizens”).
130
Id. at ch. 3, art. 40 (“All citizens are equal before the law. They have equal public rights and duties
without discrimination between them due to sex, ethnic origin, language, religion or creed.”). A
noteworthy peculiarity is that the Arabic word jins is often found translated as “race.” The word means
gender or “the nature of things.” The mistake is all the more odd since the article mentions “ethnic origin”
explicitly, which arguably would include race.
131
Id. at ch. 2, art. 9 (“The family is the basis of the society founded on religion, morality and patriotism.
The State is keen to preserve the genuine character of the Egyptian family-with what it embodies of values
and traditions—while affirming and developing this character in the relations within the Egyptian
society.”).
132
Id. at art. 11.
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cultural and economic life she should be considered equal with men, but without
violation of “the rules of Islamic jurisprudence.”133
¶28
Morocco’s constitution was first enacted in 1972 and subsequently revised in 1992
and 1996. 134 In its preamble it has a noticeable reference to the adherence to international
human rights as “arising from” the charters of international organizations. 135 Article 6
declares Islam to be the State religion and guarantees freedom of worship for all. 136 In
article 5 general equality before the law of all Moroccan citizens is promulgated 137 and
article 8 states that men and women shall enjoy equal political rights, including the right
to vote. 138
¶29
The oldest constitution is that of Tunisia. First enacted in 1959, it was revised
several times since, latest in 2002. 139 The preamble makes both a United Nations Charter
style reference to the “common heritage of peoples attached to human dignity, justice and
liberty”140 and a reference to adherence to Islam. 141 Article 1 declares that Islam is the
State religion. 142 That the president must be a Muslim is codified in article 38. 143
According to article 6, all citizens are equal before the law and have equal rights and
obligations. 144 However, these rights can only be enjoyed within the boundaries set by
law and in so far as their enjoyment is not restricted by a law enacted for the protection of
certain purposes. 145 These include the protection of others, the respect for the public
order, the national defense, the development of the economy, and social progress. 146
133

Id. (“The State shall guarantee the proper coordination between the duties of woman towards the family
and her work in the society, considering her equal with man in the fields of political, social, cultural and
economic life without violation of the rules of Islamic jurisprudence.”).
134
Law and Religion Program Emory University, Islamic Family Law: Possibilities of Reform Through
Internal Initiatives, http://www.law.emory.edu/IFL/index2.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2007).
135
DUSTUR A L-M AMLAKA A L-M AGHRIBIYYA [Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco], available at
http://www.al-bab.com/maroc/gov/con96.htm (English translation) [hereinafter M OROCCO CONST .]
(“Aware of the need of incorporating its work within the frame of the international organizations of which
it has become an active and dynamic member, the Kingdom of Morocco fully adheres to the principles,
rights and obligations arising from the charters of such organizations, as it reaffirms its determination to
abide by the universally recognized human rights.“)
136
Id. at art. 6 (“Islam shall be the State religion. The State shall guarantee freedom of worship for all.”).
137
Id. at art. 5 (“All Moroccan citizens shall be equal before the law.”).
138
Id. at art. 8 (“Men and women shall enjoy equal political rights. Any citizen of age enjoying his or her
civil and political rights shall be eligible to vote.”).
139
United Nations Development Program, Programme on Governance in the Arab Region, Democratic
Governance, Constitution, Tunisia, http://www.pogar.org/countries/constitution.asp?cid=20#sub7 (last
visited Mar. 12, 2007).
140
DUSTUR A L-JUMHURIYYA A L-TUNISIYYA [Constitution of the Tunisian Republic], available at
http://www.jurisitetunisie.com/tunisie/codes/constitution/menup.html (French translation) [hereinafter
TUNIS. CONST .]. For an English translation, see the University of Richmond, The Constitution of Tunisia,
http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Tunisiaconstitution.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2007) (“[T]o
consolidate national unity and to remain faithful to human values which constitute the common heritage of
peoples attached to human dignity, justice, and liberty, and working for peace, progress, and free
cooperation between nations[…]”).
141
Id. (“[T]o remain faithful to the teachings of Islam, to the unity of the Greater Maghreb, to its
membership of the Arab family, to cooperation with the African peoples in building a better future, and
with all peoples who are struggling for justice and liberty […]”).
142
Id. at art. 1 (“Tunisia is a free State, independent and sovereign; its religion is the Islam, its language is
Arabic, and its form is the Republic.”).
143
Id. at art. 38 (“The President of the Republic is the Head of the State. His religion is Islam.”).
144
Id. at art. 6 (“All citizens have the same rights and the same duties. They are equal before the law.”).
145
Id. at art. 7 (“The citizens exercise the plenitude of their rights in the forms and conditions established
by the law. The exercise of these rights cannot be limited except by a law enacted for the protection of
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B. The UN Charter and the International Bill of Human Rights

¶30

On grounds of the United Nations Charter (“Charter”) all member nations of the
United Nations (“UN”) – including Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia – are bound by the
minimum standards with respect to human rights as set out in the Charter. 147 The Charter
mentions women’s equality alongside the promotion of international peace and
security. 148 Article 56 of the Charter states the pledge of all Member States to take joint
and separate action for the achievement of the observance of human rights without
distinction on the grounds of sex as embodied in article 55(c). 149 This means that there is
both a duty to cooperate with the UN in observing and promoting human rights, and that
Member States may not undermine the object and purpose of the Charter by their
actions. 150
¶31
Which human rights exactly enjoy protection under the Charter can be subject to
debate. 151 The narrowest interpretation acknowledges only those rights that are
considered ius cogens, thus those norms prohibiting genocide, slavery, the murder or
disappearance of individuals, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic racial discrimination
(apartheid). 152 However, it can be argued that it also includes the prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of sex, considering the consistent promulgation of this
principle by the UN and affirmations by its Member States. 153
¶32
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) is clear about the rights of
men and women with regard to marriage: men and women “are entitled to equal rights as
to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.”154 Under international law, however,
this is not synonymous with identical treatment in every case; distinctions that are
reasonable, just, proportionate, and based on objective criteria are permitted. 155
¶33
The Charter makes no connection between religion and human rights, except for
the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion. 156 This prohibition is listed on
others, the respect for the public order, the national defense, the development of the economy, and social
progress.”).
146
Id.
147
Howland, supra note 71, at 327.
148
U.N. Charter pmbl., supra note 124 (“[R]eaffirm faith in fundamental rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small […]”).
149
Id. at art. 56 (“[P]ledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization
for the achievement of the purposes set forth in article 55”); see id. at art. 55(c) (“[U]niversal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion.”).
150
Howland, supra note 71, at 328.
151
Id. at 332-40.
152
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES Vol. 2, § 702. Ius
cogens norms are international customary law rules recognized by the international community from which
no derogation is possible. States cannot conclude (international) agreements counter to these norms.
Universal jurisdiction as well as international criminal liability is attached to these norms as the violation is
considered to shock the conscience of the international community to the greatest extent. Id.
153
See Howland, supra note 71, at 334-35 (referring to, among others, the Beijing Declaration and Platform
for Action, paragraph 94).
154
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217A, at art. 16, § 1, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm [hereinafter
UDHR].
155
Howland, supra note 71at 343.
156
Id. at 329-30.
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equal footing with other forbidden criteria such as race and sex; therefore religion does
not have privileged protection in comparison to other grounds on which discrimination
may occur. 157
The goal of the UDHR is to secure the observance of the rights enumerated in it for
all peoples regardless of gender, race, sex or nationality. 158 “All human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights,” according to article 1, and article 2 states that
everyone is entitled to the rights in the UDHR without distinction of any kind, such as
race, sex or religion. 159 Men and women are both entitled to equal recognition before the
law and to equal protection of the law without discrimination. 160
Article 16(1) declares that men and women of legal age are entitled to equal
161
rights in marriage, during marriage and with respect to divorce. 162 Limitations on the
rights embodied in the UDHR are only allowed for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and when meeting the “just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare of a democratic
society.”163 The mention of religion in the UDHR was expressly rejected by the
drafters. 164
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) further
elaborate on the principles embodied in the Charter and UDHR. 165 All three countries
have signed and ratified both treaties. 166 Egypt signed both covenants in 1967 and ratified
them in 1982. 167 Morocco did the same in 1977 and 1979 respectively, and Tunisia signed
both treaties in 1968 with ratification following one year later. 168 Morocco and Tunisia
signed and ratified both treaties without making any declarations or reservations. 169
Each covenant states in its preamble that all enumerated rights are applicable to
men and women in equal fashion. 170 The ICCPR compels States Parties to ensure the
157

Id.
UDHR pmbl., supra note 154.
159
Id. at arts. 1, 2.
160
Id. at arts. 6, 7.
161
Id. at art. 16, § 1; see also Howland, supra note 71, at 343 (on the concept of “equal rights” under
international law).
162
UDHR pmbl., supra note 154, at art. 16, § 1 (“Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to
race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights
as to marriage, during marriage and at is dissolution.”).
163
Id. at art. 29, § 2.
164
See Howland, supra note 71, at 341. The proposal came from two Christian Member States, Brazil and
the Netherlands. Id.
165
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm [hereinafter ICCPR] and International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 15, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm [hereinafter ICESCR]; infra notes 170-76 and
accompanying text.
166
For the status of signatures, ratifications and reservations, see the website of the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification (last
visited Mar. 12, 2007).
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
ICCPR, supra note 165, pmbl. (“[U]ndertaking to ensure equal rights of men and women to enjoy all
civil and political rights recognized [in the ICCPR]”); ICESCR, supra note 165, pmbl. (“[U]ndertaking to
ensure equal rights of men and women to enjoy all economic, social and cultural rights in [the ICESCR]”).
158
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equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set out in
the Covenant. 171 This means equality before the law as prescribed in article 26 172 and
equality of marital rights, rights during marriage and in divorce under article 23(4). 173
Article 3 of the ICESCR mirrors the same article of the ICCPR by stating that parties to
the Covenant should ensure “the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all
economic, social and cultural rights [set forth in the Covenant].”174 What follows is
mostly an elaboration on the rights to employment and education, but in article 10(1) the
family is mentioned. 175 According to this article, “[t]he widest possible protection and
assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group
unit of society […]. Marriage must be entered into with the free consent of the intending
spouses.”176
¶38
As mentioned above, Morocco and Tunisia signed the covenants without making
any declaration or reservation. 177 Egypt made a general declaration upon ratification of
both treaties, stating that: “[T]aking into consideration the provisions of the Islamic
Shari’a and the fact that they do not conflict with the text annexed to the instrument, we
accept, support and ratify it […].”178 It has been called into question whether religious
reservations to treaties are compatible with obligations under the UN Charter and perhaps
the same question could be raised with respect to such declarations. 179
C. CEDAW
¶39

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women180 (“CEDAW”) is the most progressive and comprehensive international
instrument dealing with women’s rights, and at the same time one of the most heavily
reserved human rights treaties. 181 CEDAW takes its provisions from the International Bill
of Human Rights, applies them to women, and while doing so tries not only to regulate
State behavior, but also that of private entities. 182 CEDAW also explicitly states that one
of its aims is the eradication of sexual stereotypes in both the public and private sphere. 183
171

ICCPR, supra note 165, at art. 3.
Id. at art. 26 (stating that law “shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination”).
173
ICCPR, supra note 165, at art. 3, § 4 (“States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps
to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its
dissolution.”).
174
ICESCR, supra note 165, at art. 3.
175
Id. art. 10, § 1.
176
Id.
177
See Website of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 166.
178
See id.
179
Howland, supra note 71, at 371-74.
180
CEDAW, supra note 124.
181
For a list of declarations, reservations and objections to CEDAW, see the website of the Department for
the Advancement of Women of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
182
Donna J. Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a Framework for Conflict
Resolution, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT ’L L. & POL. 795, 799-801 (1992). Of course, this argument can be made for a
number of rights codified in the International Bill of Human Rights as well, for example on the basis of the
concept of drittwirkung, or third party applicability, of human rights. The argument has been used, amongst
others, to make international human rights norms applicable to multinational corporations in order to
prevent these from evading proper standards of conduct when operating in States that have not the will or
172
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¶40

All Muslim countries ratifying CEDAW, except Mali and Tajikistan, made
reservations based on perceived conflicts between the Convention and the shari’a. 184
Most of these reservations were substantive and it has been stated that of all UN human
rights treaties, CEDAW “has attracted the greatest number of substantive reservations
with the potential to modify or exclude most, if not all, of the terms of the treaty.”185
Although CEDAW allows for reservations consistent with its object and purpose, 186 it can
be questioned whether all reservations stand the test of article 19(c) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states that reservations may not be contrary to
the purpose of a treaty or beyond the limits set by the treaty itself. 187
¶41
All three countries are party to CEDAW 188 and have made reservations to articles 2
and 16 of the Convention. 189 Article 2 sets out how States should enforce CEDAW
domestically. 190 It requires amongst others that States “adopt appropriate legislative and
other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination
against women” 191 and that “all appropriate measures, including legislation” be taken so
as to “modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which
constitute discrimination against women.”192 Both Egypt and Morocco have made a
reservation stating that they will do nothing that conflicts with the shari’a, thereby
limiting their commitment to the full implementation of the article. 193 Tunisia has made a

the power to exact acceptable standards of conducting business with respect to the interests of its
population, the environment, and so forth. On the accountability of private entities under international law,
including on the basis of drittwirkung, see NICOLA M.C.P. JÄGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHT S
OBLIGATIONS: IN SEARCH OF ACCOUNTABILITY (2002) and LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (M.T. Kamminga and S. Zia -Zarifi eds., 2002). Louis Henkin makes a more
general argument with reference to the applicability of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to nonstate entities: “Every individual and every organ of society excludes no one, no company, no market, no
cyberspace. The Universal Declaration applies to them all.” Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration at 50
and the Challenge of Global Markets, 1 BROOK. J. OF INT ’L L. 17, 25 (1999).
183
CEDAW, supra note 124, at art. 5(a).
184
Many non-Muslim countries made reservations as well, including most of the European Union. See
Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT ’L L. 643 (1990).
185
Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination
Against Women, 85 A M. J. INT ’L L. 281, 317 (1991).
186
CEDAW, supra note 124, at art. 28, § 2.
187
Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties art. 19(c), Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; Cook, supra
note 184, at 648-63; see also Bharathi Anandhi Venkatra man, Islamic States and the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Are the Shari’a and the
Convention Compatible?, 44 A M. U. L. REV. 1949 (1995) (surveying the reservations made by a number of
Islamic states, including Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia). Venkatraman comes to the conclusion that the
reservations made by these states were actually not necessary as the Convention is not in conflict with the
shari’a because the norms in CEDAW leave room for a certain measure of cultural relativism. Id.
188
Egypt signed the Convention in 1980 and ratified it in 1981, Morocco acceded in 1993, and Tunisia
signed it in 1980 and ratified it in 1985. See U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for
the Advancement of Women, States Parties, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (last
visited Mar. 12, 2007).
189
See Clark, supra note 185.
190
CEDAW, supra note 124, at art. 2.
191
Id. at art. 2(b).
192
Id. at art. 2(f).
193
See Cook, supra note 184, at 687.
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general declaration stating that it will not adopt legislation conflicting with the first
chapter of the Tunisian constitution, which declares Islam to be the State religion. 194
Article 16 deals with the family in particular. 195 It lays down the equal freedom of
men and women to enter into marriage and choose a spouse, 196 the equal duties during
marriage and divorce 197 and equal rights with respect to children, including the right to
decide the number and spacing of children. 198 Also, States Parties must set a minimum
age for marriage in order to prevent child marriages. 199
Egypt and Morocco have made a reservation based on the concept of
complementarity of the rights and duties of both spouses. 200 The reservations are based on
the rationale set out in section II.C, according to which the rights and duties of husband
and wife are each other’s counterparts. 201 From this point of view, the fact that the wife
receives a dower as her personal property upon marriage and can receive maintenance
after divorce, gives her a degree of leverage and independence that should balance out
her husband’s unrestricted right to divorce. 202 This has been referred to as an “innovative
‘separate but equal’ argument,”203 portraying the Islamic concept of women’s equality in
terms of complementary rights. According to Rebecca Cook, a preeminent human rights
scholar, framing the roles of men and women as different but of equal value may very
well satisfy the requirements of the Convention. 204
Tunisia makes no such elaborate argument; it simply has declared that the majority
of the provisions of article 16 205 must not conflict with its Law of Personal Status. 206 This
is arguably in contravention of the norm that forbids States to invoke their domestic
legislation to excuse non-compliance with a treaty. 207
Some criticism can be applied to all three countries’ reservations. Although cultural
relativism is argued to be allowed up to a certain extent under CEDAW, 208 religion may
not be used to derogate from universal rights, as discussed with respect to the
International Bill of Human Rights. 209 One suggested solution is a narrower formulation
of the reservations, 210 which would make the domestic regulations more compatible with

194

Id.
CEDAW, supra note 124, at art. 16.
196
Id. at art. 16, § 1 (a)-(b).
197
Id. at art. 16, § 1 (c).
198
Id. at art. 16, § 1 (d), (e), (f).
199
Id. at art. 16, § 2.
200
See U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for the Advancement of Women,
Declarations, Reservations, and Objections to CEDAW,
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
201
See Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 11.
202
Id.; Venkatraman, supra note 187, at 1960.
203
Venkatraman, supra note 187, at 1960.
204
Cook, supra note 184, at 704.
205
The reservation applies to paragraphs c, d, f, g and h, dealing with the rights and responsibilities during
marriage and divorce, rights regarding guardianship, and property rights. See CEDAW, supra note 124, at
art. 16, § 1 (c).
206
Id.
207
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 187, at art. 27.
208
See Venkatraman, supra note 187, at 2000-06.
209
See UDHR, supra note 154.
210
Venkatraman, supra note 187, at 2006-07.
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the requirements of CEDAW, taking “a certain amount of cultural relativity” into account
in its enforcement. 211
IV. ANALYSIS OF PAST AND PRESENT LEGISLATION
¶46

Having discussed in broad lines the Islamic rules on marriage and divorce as well
as the constitutional and international legal provisions on the position of women in family
law, this article will now discuss the law reforms in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.
A. Egypt

Egypt started codifying its reformed family law early in the twentieth century. 212
Prior to that, Egyptian personal status law was based primarily on the Hanafi school of
jurisprudence. 213 Although the first laws combined elements from different schools, the
Hanafi teachings were considered to be default rules in case no textual provision was
available. 214
¶48
Although most of Egyptian law was secularized during the second half of the
twentieth century, family law remained the domain of Islamic rules. 215 The secularization
can mainly be attributed to the reception of European laws216 and partly be considered as
the legacy of British colonization from the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. 217 In its turn, the secularization process has perhaps led to a more tenacious
adherence to Islamic jurisprudence in family law. 218 Not only does the fact that the family
plays a pivotal role in Muslim society make the reform of family law a controversial
issue, it also has a symbolic meaning as the last bastion of more traditional principles in
contrast to the sacrifice of traditional values for European concepts of law in other
areas. 219
¶49
The most important laws on matters dealing with issues of personal status are Law
No. 25 of 1920, 220 Law No. 56 of 1923 221 and Law No. 25 of 1929. 222 These have been
amended by Law No. 100 of 1985 223 and recently by Personal Status Law No. 1 of
¶47

211

Id. at 2005.
See Law No. 20 (1920) (Egypt); Anderson, Modern Trends, supra note 1, at 6.
213
Anderson, Modern Trends, supra note 1, at 5.
214
See Law No. 78 (1931) (Egypt).
215
Anderson, Modern Trends, supra note 1; J. N. D. Anderson, Law Reform in Egypt 1850-1950, in
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN M ODERN EGYPT 209, 217-19 (P.M. Holt ed., 1968).
216
See Daniel Crecelius, The Course of Secularization in Modern Egypt, in RELIGION AND POLITICAL
M ODERNIZATION 67 (Donald E. Smith ed., 1974).
217
Id.
218
See Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT ’L
L. 1043, 1047 (2004) (arguing that reforms in family law in Egypt have been structurally impaired because
of the need to split the difference between progressive activists for women’s rights and the more
conservative religious parties within society in any attempt for reform, and stating that “in order for all
other laws to be secularized, family law had to represent the limit of, the exception to, the sacrificial lamb
of secularization”).
219
Id.
220
Law Concerning the Provisions on and Certain Matters of Personal Status, No. 25 (1920) (Egypt).
221
Law on Marriage Age, No. 56 (1923) (Egypt).
222
Law Concerning Certain Provisions on Personal Status, No. 25 (1929) (Egypt).
223
Personal Status (Amendment) Law, No. 100 (1985) (Egypt).
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2000.224 As will be discussed shortly, an attempt in 1979 to more drastically amend the
laws of 1920 and 1925 was declared unconstitutional on procedural grounds by the
Supreme Constitutional Court in 1985. 225
¶50
Law No. 25 of 1920 codified the rules on maintenance and the wife’s petition for a
judicial divorce in case of non-payment of maintenance or serious physical or
psychological conditions of the husband. 226 Maintenance was due even if the wife was
sick or wealthy. 227 That maintenance included not only food, clothing and
accommodation but also medical treatment was an innovation; under traditional law
medical expenses were not explicitly recognized as maintenance. 228 The entitlement to
maintenance was lost in case the woman ceased to be a Muslim, either by choice or
forced by circumstances, or if she left the matrimonial home without a valid reason and
without “permission of her husband.”229
¶51
If the man was ill or had any other impediment that would interfere with his sexual
functions, the wife could petition for divorce. 230 Another possibility was given in Law
No. 25 of 1929. 231 If the wife claimed that her husband had caused her harm or injury
which made their living together as a couple impossible and no reconciliation was
possible, she could request judicial divorce from a judge. 232 Even though the concept of
talaq left the decision on divorce mainly with the husband, these laws can be considered
progressive to some extent as they deviated from a number of Hanafi teachings. 233
¶52
During the following decades, law reform took on a particularly slow pace. 234
Several attempts were made to restrict polygamy and the man’s unilateral decision to
divorce, but with no success. 235 The 1952 revolution under leadership of Gamal Abdel
Nasser finally catalyzed a number of reforms, among which the recognition of equal
rights of women and their right to vote in the 1956 constitution. 236 The 1959 Labor Law
acknowledged women’s equality and women obtained positions in the cabinet. 237
However, efforts to extend these reforms to the field of family law proved to be very
difficult. 238 Several proposals were made, but never accepted due to either great religious
and political resistance or external circumstances. 239 Finally, President Anwar al-Sadat
224

Law on Reorganization of Certain Terms and Procedures of Litigation in Personal Status Matters, No. 1
(2000) (Egypt) [hereinafter Egyptian Personal Status Law, No. 1].
225
The case was the result of Case no. 29/1980 Badari Court of Summary Justice for Guardianship of the
Person, in which a woman filed for maintenance from her husband. See Fauzi M. Najjar, Egypt’s Laws of
Personal Status, 10(3) A RAB STUD . Q. 319, 337 (1988).
226
W OMEN ’S RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW , PERSPECTIVES ON REFORM 33 (Lynn Welchman ed.,
2004) [hereinafter W OMEN’S RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW ].
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
Id.
230
Id. (citing insanity and “the two kinds of leprosy” as examples of physical or psychological impairment
of the husband as grounds for judicial divorce).
231
W OMEN ’S RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW , supra note 226, at 34.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
For an overview of the attempts to reform the Egyptian Personal Status Law, see Najjar, supra note 225,
at 320-23.
235
Id.
236
Id. at 320.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id. at 321-23.
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issued a decree in 1979, promulgating Personal Status Law No. 44 240 without prior
approval of the people’s assembly. 241 The law was confirmed 14 days later by an
assembly in which the president’s party had the majority. 242 The law met great praise
from liberals and feminists as well as critique from both conservatives and those who did
not object as much to the content of the law but more to the way it was adopted. 243
Personal Status Law No. 44 provided a number of significant changes for women’s
position in marriage and divorce. 244 For example, a wife’s right to maintenance was no
longer affected when she went to work without her husband’s consent, unless the work
was against the interest of her family. 245 A wife who otherwise refused to obey her
husband still forfeited her right to maintenance, but the use of force to make her obey was
prohibited. 246
The polygamous marriage of her husband was now also considered an injury for
which the wife could petition for divorce. 247 This was irrespective of whether she had
stipulated anything in the marriage contract and the rule applied to both the first wife and
the new wife from whom the fact that her husband was already married had been
hidden. 248
Talaq was restricted in the sense that a divorce had to be properly registered and
did not take effect until the wife had been notified. 249 If a wife was repudiated without her
consent or any apparent cause on her part, she could receive an indemnity in addition to
the legal maintenance. 250
A divorced woman received custody of her male children until the age of ten and
her female children until they reached the age of twelve, with the possibility of extension
up to fifteen for a son and until her marriage for a daughter. 251 Custody of the children
entailed the exclusive right to the matrimonial home for as long as the former husband
had not provided for other suitable accommodation. 252
Personal Status Law No. 44 was abolished by the Supreme Constitutional Court in
1985 on grounds that the law had been declared by presidential decree during a period
when the people’s assembly was not in session and had not been presented for approval
when parliament reconvened, as required by the constitution. 253 This meant a return to the
laws of the 1920’s, a situation quickly remedied by the adoption of Law No. 100 of

240

Personal Status Law, No. 44 (1979) (Egypt). The law was somewhat mockingly referred to as “Jihan’s
Law” after the wife of the president who allegedly was very much in favor of its provisions.
241
Najjar, supra note 225, at 323.
242
Id.
243
On the various objections raised, see Najjar, supra note 225, at 326-36.
244
See W OMEN’S RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW , supra note 226, at 33-34; supra pp. 29-30.
245
Brandt & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 113.
246
Personal Status Law, No. 44, supra note 240, at art. 6 (bb), see Najjar, supra note 225, at 332.
247
Najja r, supra note 225, at 328-29.
248
ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 59.
249
Id.
250
Personal Status Law, No. 44, supra note 240, at art. 18 bis; see ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 59.
251
Brandt & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 113 (citing the Report of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, 29, U.N. Doc. A/39/45 (1984)).
252
Id. at 112.
253
Najjar, supra note 225, at 336-38.
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1985.254 In great lines, the 1985 law resembled Personal Status Law No. 44, but the
setback for women on certain issues was significant. 255
¶58
The right of a wife to go out and work was restricted considerably; 256 she could still
go out and work, but only if it did not “appear that her use of this right [was] corrupted by
abuse of the right” or that her husband had not asked her to refrain from exercising her
right. 257 Also, the injury caused by a husband marrying an additional wife was no longer
considered a legal presumption; the injury now had to be proven. 258 The standard given to
prove such injury was very subjective: a woman had to show that ‘women like her’ could
no longer live together with her husband under the circumstances. 259 Talaq would now
take effect from the date it was uttered, but when a husband concealed the divorce from
his wife, consequences in the area of inheritance and other financial rights took effect
only from the day she obtained knowledge of it. 260
¶59
Over the years, the Egyptian government came to consider the law of 1985 as a
“considerable embarrassment” on the international level and in the building of
international economic relations. 261 In addition, the Egyptian feminist movement did not
stand for the situation and in 1998 a special committee was formed to draft a proposal of
law reform. 262 Law No. 1 of 2000 was adopted in January 2000. 263
¶60
Under Law No. 1 a wife has the right to petition for divorce without having to
prove injury by returning the dower given to her. 264 No injury or incompatibility needs to
be proven, but she must affirm that there is no way for them to continue married life. 265
Talaq only takes effect as opposed to the wife when it can be confirmed by witnesses and
documentation. 266 It is expressly stated in the explanatory memorandum, however, that
this only pertains to its legal effects; the talaq may still have its religious effect. 267 As
Lynn Welchman, a prominent Islamic and Middle Eastern law scholar, points out, 268 this
may very well place women in a difficult position. A man may divorce his wife without
the presence of witnesses, not register the talaq and thereby prevent her from marrying
someone else after her iddah has passed. 269 He may even deny having divorced her all
together. 270
254

Personal Status Law, No. 100 (1985) (Egypt).
See W OMEN’S RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW , supra note 226, at 39; Najjar, supra note 225, at 341.
The 1985 law restricted the possibility for married women to go out to work and a wife now had to prove
that a second marriage by her husband constituted an injury. Id.
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W OMEN ’S RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW , supra note 226, at 39.
257
Id.
258
Na jjar, supra note 225, at 341.
259
W OMEN ’S RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW , supra note 226, at 39.
260
Id. at 38.
261
Id. at 58.
262
Id.
263
Egyptian Personal Status Law No. 1, supra note 224; W OMEN’S RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW ,
supra note 226, at 59.
264
Egyptian Personal Status Law No. 1, supra note 224, at art. 20.
265
Nehad Abu El-Komsan, Women between Islamic Shari’a and Personal Status Laws, THE EGYPTIAN
CT R. FOR WOMEN'S RTS 12, http://www.wluml.org/english/news/ecwr-women-personal-status-laws.pdf.
266
Egyptian Personal Status Law No. 1, supra note 224, at art. 21.
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W OMEN ’S RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW , supra note 226, at 68.
268
Id.
269
Id.
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Id.
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A woman may try and prove her husband’s revocation of talaq by any means. 271 If
she is the one to deny the revocation, her husband can however only prove his claim if he
has informed her with an official document of revocation within the iddah period. 272
¶62
In both talaq and judicial divorce, the court has to attempt to reconcile spouses
before ruling on a divorce. 273 When the couple has children, the court is to offer
reconciliation at least two times, which have to be at least thirty and not more than sixty
days apart. 274
¶61

B. Morocco
¶63

As in the case of Egypt, Morocco’s family law is the only part of its code that is
still based on Islamic law. 275 A comprehensive codification and law reform project was
first undertaken in 1957 and 1958, when a special commission set down the rules
developed within the shari’a courts during colonization. 276 The Law of Personal Status or
Mudawwana consisted of six books. 277 It was mainly based on the Maliki school and the
first two books dealt with marriage and divorce. 278 Over the years, some reforms have
been made but none as dramatic as the adoption of the new Moroccan family law in
2004.279 One of the driving forces behind the development of the code was the Moroccan
royal house. 280 The process of reform, set into motion by King Muhammad VI’s father
King Hassan II in the late 1990’s, was given an unexpected impetus by the bomb attacks
in Casablanca in 2003. 281 In October 2003, the King delivered a speech to the Moroccan
parliament in which he showed his determination to present an alternative version of the
radical Islam connected to the bombings. 282 He laid out the main points of the new law,
referring to Quranic verses to underline its compatibility with the shari’a and also made it
quite clear that his authority was supreme, implying that parliament better not set aside
his urging to adopt the new law. 283
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Id. at art. 18, § 2, art. 19, §§ 1, 2.
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Anderson, Modern Trends, supra note 1.
276
CHARRAD, supra note 3, at 161-62; J. N. D. Anderson, Reforms in Family Law in Morocco, 2 J. A FR. L.
146, 146-47 (1958).
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Anderson, Reforms in Family Law in Morocco, supra note 276, at 146.
278
CHARRAD, supra note 3, at 167-68; Anderson, Reforms in Family Law in Morocco, supra note 276, at
146-47 (describing the law of 1958 and noting that it corresponds closely to Maliki principles throughout
his article).
279
CODE DE LA FAMILLE (Law No. 70-03 of 2004) [hereinafter M OROCCAN FAMILY CODE OF 2004].
280
Stephanie Willman Bordat & Saida Kouzi, The Challenge of Implementing Morocco’s New Personal
Status Law, 2 A RAB REFORM BULL. 8 (2004), www.ceip.org/arabreform. On the Moroccan royal house and
women’s position, see Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, Women, Islam and the Moroccan State: The Struggle over
the Personal Status Law, 59 M IDDLE E. J. 393, 396-97 (2005).
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Bordat & Kouzi, supra note 280.
282
H. M. King Muhammad VI, Speech at the Opening of the Parliament Fall Session (Oct. 10, 2003),
http://www.mincom.gov.ma/english/generalities/speech/2003/ParliamentFallSession101003.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2007).
283
Id. (“As the King of all Moroccans, I do not make legislation for a given segment of the population or a
specific party. Rather, I seek to reflect the general will of the Nation, which I consider my extended
family.”).
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¶64

The family code starts with a preamble which incorporates the eleven fundamental
reforms King Muha mmad laid out before parliament: 1) the adoption of a modern form of
wording and the removal of degrading and debasing terms for women; 2) the freedom of
women to arrange their own marriage (thus abolishing the mandatory intervention of a
wali or guardian) ; 3) equality between men and women with respect to the minimum age
for marriage; 4) allowing polygamy only under stringent restrictions; 5) the simplification
of marriage procedures for Moroccans living abroad; 6) making divorce equally available
to men and women; 7) the expansion of a woman’s right to divorce when the husband
does not fulfill the conditions in the marriage contract; 8) protection of children’s
interests with respect to custody; 9) the acknowledgement of paternity of children born
out of registered marriage; 10) equality in matters of inheritance; 11) the possibility to
make arrangements for property acquired during marriage. 284
¶65
Under the new law, the family is the joint responsibility of both spouses, 285 while
under the previous legislation the family was the responsibility of the husband. 286 This
included full financial responsibility. 287 In return, the wife was held to obey her
husband. 288 In the new code the stipulation that the wife should obey her husband has
been removed and she must now also contribute to household expenses. 289 A wife can
also no longer request a divorce on the basis of lack of financial support if she has
sufficient means to support herself and her husband has no financial means. 290
¶66
Polygamy is forbidden when there is a risk of inequity between the wives. 291
Authorization from the court is needed and is refused if “an exceptional objective
justification is not proven” or if the man does not have the sufficient resources to support
both families. 292 When the husband makes his petition to the court, his first wife is
informed and invited to attend the hearing. 293 If the court grants permission for the second
marriage, this may not take place before the future wife has been informed about the fact
that her husband to be is already married. 294 The current wife may request a divorce and
the court can award her a sum of money as compensation. 295 If the husband does not pay
the sum, this is considered as a withdrawal of the petition for authorization of
polygamy. 296 The former legislation did not require the authorization of a judge; however,
a husband was required to inform his wife of his decision to marry again and tell his
potential bride that he was already married. 297
¶67
The conclusion of her marriage contract by anyone else is something the woman
has to delegate expressly. 298 As opposed to the former legislation, under which a woman
284
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M OROCCAN FAMILY CODE OF 2004, supra note 279, at art. 51.
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CHARRAD, supra note 3, at 162.
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Id.
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Id.
289
M OROCCAN FAMILY CODE OF 2004, supra note 279, at art. 51.
290
Id. at art. 188.
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Id. at art. 40.
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Id. at art. 41.
293
Id. at art. 44.
294
Id. at art. 46.
295
Id. at art. 45.
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Id.
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CHARRAD, supra note 3, at 165-66.
298
M OROCCAN FAMILY CODE OF 2004, supra note 279, at art. 25.
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needed the consent of her guardian, 299 the new law states that “marriage tutelage is the
woman’s right, which she exercises upon reaching majority according to her choice and
interests.”300
Talaq is made conditional upon the court’s consent. 301 This is a considerable
limitation as opposed to the virtually unrestricted right of the husband to repudiate his
wife under the previous legislation. 302 As under the Egyptian law, the law prescribes the
adherence to the Quranic principle that the court should attempt to have the spouses
reconcile. 303 Before the divorce can be registered the husband must pay all the money he
owes his wife, including any delayed dower, maintenance for the iddah and a so-called
“consolation gift” which is assessed on the basis of the length of the marriage, the
financial position of the husband, the reason for the repudiation and the extent to which
the husband has abused his right. 304 During the period of iddah the wife is to stay in the
marital home or suitable alternative accommodation. 305 Otherwise, the court determines a
fixed sum to cover the housing expenses. 306
Either spouse or both spouses together may petition for divorce on the grounds of
irreconcilable differences. 307 Divorce by mutual consent under judicial supervision did
not exist under the old law. 308 A reconciliation effort should be undertaken by two
arbitrators or two other persons fit for the task, but the suit has to be settled within no
more than six months after the petition for divorce was filed. 309
Under the old family law a wife could only petition for divorce on limited grounds:
harm caused by her husband—which was very difficult to prove in court—nonmaintenance, a defect in her husband, absence of the husband for more than a year in an
unknown location and without valid justification, or an oath of abstinence taken by the
husband. 310 The other option would be for her to buy herself free from the marriage by
returning (part of) the dower or by other means of compensation. 311 The new family law
allows petition for divorce also if the husband does not comply with any one of the
conditions in the marriage contract; 312 failure to comply with any condition in the
marriage contract is considered to constitute a harm that justifies a divorce request. 313 A
harm can be established by any means of proof and if the wife does not succeed, she can
resort to the irreconcilable differences procedure. 314
Finally, an innovative feature with respect to custody is that under certain
circumstances a woman can retain custody of her children if she remarries or moves away
299

CHARRAD, supra note 3, at 163.
M OROCCAN FAMILY CODE OF 2004, supra note 279, at art. 24.
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Id. at art. 79.
302
CHARRAD, supra note 3, at 165.
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M OROCCAN FAMILY CODE OF 2004, supra note 279, at art. 82.
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Id. at art 84.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at art. 94.
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Anderson, Reforms in Family Law in Morocco, supra note 276, at 154-59.
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M OROCCAN FAMILY CODE OF 2004, supra note 279, at arts. 95, 96, 97.
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Anderson, Reforms in Family Law in Morocco, supra note 276, at 156-57.
311
Id. at 157-58.
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M OROCCAN FAMILY CODE OF 2004, supra note 279, at art. 98.
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Id. at art. 99.
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Id. at art. 100.
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from the area where her former husband lives. 315 Custody is exercised until both sons and
daughters reach the age of legal majority. 316 Also, it is specifically stipulated that children
should get suitable accommodation, consistent with the living conditions when the
parents were still married. 317 This is a separate arrangement from the maintenance
obligations. 318
¶72
In sum, the new family law provides for some progressive changes as opposed to
the old legislation. It remains to be seen, however, how great the practical effect of the
reform will be. Much depends on the acceptance and application of the new law by the
judiciary as well as the use that will be made of loopholes such as article 400 319 which
allows religious principles to be applied under certain circumstances. Such issues will be
addressed further in Part V.
C. Tunisia
Tunisia adopted a Personal Status Law right after independence. 320 The Majalla
was first adopted in 1956 321 and was based on both Maliki and Hanafi principles. 322 Its
last major reform was in 1993. 323
¶74
The two most progressive features of the Tunisian Personal Status Law are its
abolition of polygamy and extrajudicial divorce. 324 No restrictions or conditions are give n
to permit polygamy under any circumstances, it is simply stated that “polygamy is
prohibited,”325 followed by the punishment by law incurred when acting contrary to this
provision. 326
¶75
The rationale behind the abolition of polygamy finds its roots in the Quranic verse
stating that one can only marry several wives if they receive equal treatment. 327
According to the legislature this condition is humanly impossible to fulfill. 328 Hence,
polygamy is forbidden. 329
¶73
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Maliki School of Jurisprudence and to ijtihad which strive to fulfill and enhance Islamic values, notably
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world]). That this perception may be based on a legal fiction will be briefly discussed in Part V.
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PERSONAL STATUS].
322
CHARRAD, supra note 3, at 218-31.
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Id.
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at 268.
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¶76

In similar simple fashion article 30 provides that “Divorce shall only take place in
court,”330 thereby restricting the use of unilateral talaq by the husband. 331 The same
article in the 1957 law read: “Divorce outside a court of law is without legal effect.”332
The different choice of wording may imply an attempt to prevent a situation as suggested
could happen under the current Egyptian law – a man divorcing his wife in the religious
but not judicial sense, thus making her situation practically impossible. 333
¶77
Divorce can be granted upon request of either the husband or wife on grounds
specified in the law, by mutual agreement of the spouses, or if one of the spouses insists
on grounds other than those specified in the Personal Status Law, in which case the court
determines the compensation to be paid by the insisting spouse. 334 As in the two codes
discussed before, the court first has to ascertain that no possibility of reconciliation
between the spouses exists. 335 If there are minor children, at least three reconciliation
hearings must be held. 336 Upon divorce, custody can be awarded to either spouse, keeping
the best interest of the child in mind. 337
¶78
Although the provision on the mutual duties of husband and wife of the 1957 law
already included the obligation of the wife to contribute to the household if she had
private means – considered in fair balance with “the advantages assured to her by the new
legislation,”338 including that the husband had no rights over his wife’s property339 – it
took until 1993 for the obligation of obedience to be removed from the code and be
replaced by “a mutual duty between husband and wife” in managing family affairs. 340
¶79
The main rationale behind this reform was the suppression of domestic violence, a
grave problem in Tunisia. 341 Considering the otherwise progressive approach taken in the
codification of family law and the way Islamic rules have been interpreted in the process,
it seems surprising that it took so long for this amendment to take place. 342 The delay can
possibly be ascribed to the difficult socio-economic situation in the country, in
combination with the growing strength of the conservative and religious factions. 343
D. A Brief Comparative Assessment
¶80

The question first and foremost should be by which standard to assess the extent to
which these recent law reforms have improved the situation of women in their respective
countries. As we are dealing with family codes based on shari’a, it would hardly make
sense to measure it against current Western models of family law, for these codes are
330
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332
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Id. at art. 32.
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Id.
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Id. at art. 67.
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based on a different type of philosophy as has been set out earlier. The argument made by
countries like Egypt and Morocco with respect to their reservations to CEDAW, in that
balance can be found in other ways than a strict interpretation of formal equal treatment,
is worth consideration. 344 However, this argument is also potentially dangerous as it could
negate the extent to which social patterns, patriarchal structures and sexual stereotypes
influence our views on what is considered so inherently different between men and
women, besides a number of biological characteristics.
¶81
A reassessment of what defines “balance” and complementarity between marriage
partners should be possible. After all, a lot has changed since these countries first
codified their family law, both on the national and international plane. By no means does
this article argue that the standards shared among a great number of what are referred to
as Western States are the only guidelines to go by, but if we have any belief in what is
written in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – to which, after all, the majority
of countries adhere – that human rights are inalienable and universal, a “separate but
equal” doctrine just falls short.
¶82
From this point of view, both the Egyptian and the Moroccan code fall short where
it comes to the possibility of both husband and wife to obtain divorce. 345 Although the
restrictions the Egyptian and Moroccan legislature placed upon the use of talaq is a step
in the right direction, the Tunisian code, which makes divorce equally accessible to men
and women under the same conditions, would be preferable. 346 Naturally, it all depends
on how such regulations work out in practice, but merely looking at the legal provisions
the Tunisian legislation seems to offer the highest degree of equality. 347 There is little
problem in the fact that divorce is only allowed on specific grounds. 348 Besides the fact
that the so-called no fault divorce is a relatively recent development and its merits have
not yet been fully assessed, the critical point of discussion here is that the options are
equally available to both marriage partners, not so much what the exact options are. 349 By
contrast, the possibilities offered to a woman under Egyptian and Moroccan law—the
possibility to buy her way out of a marriage, or request a divorce within a stringent set of
limitations when the consent of her spouse cannot be obtained—cannot be equated with
the husband’s unfettered discretionary ability to get a divorce, even if he has to do so
officially before a court. 350
¶83
All codes have placed restrictions on marital age and none explicitly require
consent from a father or guardian. 351 Again, this says nothing about the practical reality,
especially since the minimum age for marriage in Egypt and Tunisia is lower for women
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than for men. 352 Even if women are allowed to conclude their own marriage contract, the
difference in age could constitute a significant distortion in the balance of bargaining
power with the possible result of a disadvantageous content of the marriage contract.
Many factors could cause this, such as the fact that the girl is insufficiently aware of her
options due to her young age, inexperience with the process of negotiation, or
dependence on the advice of elders who may not necessarily have the interests most
important for the girl in mind. It is hard to see how it might occur to a 16 year old girl
that she may want to work at some point in her life or to resist the pressure of her family
and peers not to include a corresponding clause in her marriage contract. This is not to
underestimate the maturity of mind some people may have at a young age, but it will
already be difficult for an 18 year old to make decisions concerning what should be a lifelong commitment, let alone for someone of a younger age facing a bargaining partner
who is at least some years her senior.
¶84
When it comes to rights and duties during marriage and upon divorce, Tunisia and
Morocco are at the forefront although striking out the wife’s obedience requirement in
Tunisia as late as 1993 was a bit tardy. 353 The lack of clarity as to whether a wife can go
to work without her husband’s consent under the current Egyptian law354 is a serious
defect, even though the formal requirement of obedience can no longer be found in the
law. 355 Morocco is behind on Tunisia though, when one accepts the argument that
polygamy ipso facto results in unequal treatment of multiple wives. 356 The requirement of
permission from the court does make the procedure more onerous for a husband wanting
to marry a new wife and gives the existing wife the opportunity to “opt out,” but this does
not change the fact that the wife will always have this possibility looming over her. 357 She
may be able to get out of the marriage, but this does not mean the situation is favorable
for her, losing the status of a married woman as well as possibly the comfort of her home
and custody over her children. 358 The situation under Egyptian law, requiring the wife to
request the divorce herself, even if the second marriage is assumed to be a harm, is even
more adverse for her. 359
¶85
The award of custody on the basis of the best interest of the child, as found in the
Tunisian legislation, leaves the judge more flexibility to determine what is better for the
children after the divorce instead of the automatic assignment of custody to either the
mother or father. 360 The Moroccan law has the advantage of allowing the children to stay
with their mother until they are mature, in some cases including when the mother
remarries. 361
¶86
Keeping in mind the principle of balance between the spouses, a wife’s right to
work while adhering to the husband’s obligation to provide maintenance might be
352
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regarded as problematic. The Tunisian and Moroccan law attempt to restore balance by
requiring the wife to contribute to the household when she has the means to do so. 362 A
possible solution might be to express the maintenance obligations in a gender-neutral
fashion or to qualify them so as to have each spouse contribute according to their
capacity. It would fit well with the mutual obligations for the family as formulated so
explicitly in the Moroccan code and would still leave ample room for the traditional
division of roles. If the wife’s main task is to take care of the children and the household,
the man’s is to provide financial maintenance. Naturally, this division of responsibility
could also be made part of the marriage contract. There would need to be ample
safeguards, however, to ensure that women do not end up shouldering both the burden of
the household and maintenance.
¶87
The reform in each country reflects a step forward to a certain degree. In the case of
Egypt, steps are taken most cautiously; the autonomy of women is still not very great
although the situation significantly improved as opposed to previous legislation. 363 The
fact that the law reform was the result of an extensive debate within society and the
government alike may offer potential for future reforms. Morocco’s form of government
allows more dramatic changes to take place, as has been pointed out above when
discussing the role the royal house has played in the law reform. 364 There are still some
significant improvements to be made, but the new family law is an important step
forward. 365 Tunisia’s family law remains the most progressive in the aspects discussed
here. 366 However, the momentum for further progress seems to have been lost after the
proclamation of the first personal status law. 367 In addition, there is the issue of
discrepancy between practice and theory, discussed in the following section.
V. SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS
¶88

The practical effect of these law reforms has not been easy to assess. A number of
factors could hamper their implementation.
¶89
First, courts in all three countries are known to fall back on the shari’a in case the
law does not provide ample rules to deal with the situation at hand. 368 This opens the door
to revert to those rules the new legislation aimed to override. How great this risk is,
would depend on the familiarity of judges with the contents of the new legislation and
perhaps even a willingness to apply it.
¶90
A second issue is the familiarity of women with their position under the law. Issues
such as illiteracy and more generally the availability of information – which is more
likely to play a role in rural areas than in big cities – can prevent women from claiming
whatever rights they have under the law due to the mere fact that they are unaware of
362

See id. at arts. 187-88; TUNISIAN CODE OF PERSONAL STATUS, supra note 321, at arts. 23, 24.
See supra Part IV.A.
364
See Bordat & Kouzi, supra note 280.
365
See supra Part IV.B.
366
See supra Part IV.C.
367
CHARRAD, supra note 3, at 218-32.
368
Article 6 of Law No. 462/1055 and Article 280 of Law No. 78/1931 of Egypt and Article 400 of the
Moroccan Family Code go as far as prescribing the default application of shari’a. Tunisian courts have also
been reported to revert to shari’a, which is probably not very surprising as the family code has never been
considered as a comprehensive codification. See Anderson, Modern Trends, supra note 1, at 275.
363

209

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2007

their existence. 369 Human rights lawyer Michelle Brandt and founder of the ePolicy
Group Jeffrey Kaplan cite that in 1981 at least 51% of Tunisian women were unaware of
the country’s family code. 370 This has been followed up with an extensive program to
combat illiteracy in the country, so the numbers may very well have improved since. 371
¶91
Third, the influence of societal structure and traditional role patterns should not be
underestimated. Expectations within the immediate family and ideas formed by one’s
upbringing are hard to negate. Issues such as economic underdevelopment and resurgence
of Islamic fundamentalism can also have a detrimental effect on the choices available or
the liberty in making them. Tunisian lawyer Alya Cherif Chamari stresses the
discrepancy between the perceived emancipated position of Tunisian women as it is laid
down by law and their real position in society. She questions whether in such case there
really can be talk of ‘emancipation’ of women:
“A l’évidence, les lois régissant le statut des femmes dans la famille sont
beaucoup plus protectrices qu’égalitaires. Si le législateur a supprimé les
inégalitées les plus flagrantes, tels la polygamie, la répudiation, le «djabr»,
il n’en a pas moins conforté les rôles traditionnels de l’homme et de la
femme dans la sphère familiale.
D’ailleurs, le discours politique officiel qui a accompagné les réformes
«émancipatrices» a toujours rappelé à la femme que son «émancipation»
ne devait pas lui faire perdre de vue le rôle traditionnel d’épouse et de
mère, tous les autres rôles qu’elle serait amenée à avoir en tant que
citoyenne, travailleuse, syndicaliste ne pouvant être que secondaires.
C’est ainsi que le législateur tunisien a conforté les structures familiales,
conformément au modèle patriarcal traditionnel, en instituant la famille
légitime dominée par l’hégémonie masculine et mettant la femme en
situation de dépendance permanente, qu’elle soit fille, épouse ou mère.
Dans ces conditions, comment peut-on encore parler d’émancipation?"372
¶92

Finally, there can be several issues that pertain to the countries specifically. The
uncertainty regarding the limits of the marriage contract in Egypt, previously discussed
would be one example. 373 A frequent criticism on the Moroccan reform is the creation of
369
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separate family courts in too small a number to be able to adequately deal with all matters
brought before them. 374 It has been suggested that this separation from the general courts
could result in a lower standard of justice in cases of family law. 375 The validity of this
argument is hard to assess as specialization can have its advantages with respect to speed
and efficiency. It is also not uncommon to have courts divided up in specialized
chambers. Nevertheless, this is something that should be closely monitored.
VI. CONCLUSION
¶93

As far as the letter of the law is concerned, the law reforms do represent a step
forward for women when it comes to marriage and divorce. A number of caveats have to
be kept in mind with respect to the effect these reforms may have in reality, but as
interesting and urgent a question as this may be, it falls outside the scope of this article.
¶94
Tunisia may be the only exception when it comes to reforms quantity-wise, but the
deletion of the obedience principle is a qualitative improvement and its code was already
quite advanced to begin with. 376 Morocco has made the greatest stride forwards compared
to its old family law, although the establishment of a separate family court system may or
may not contribute very positively. 377 Egypt has made some improvement, placing certain
restrictions on polygamy and the uncontrolled use of talaq. 378 However, there are serious
loopholes in the law and divorce is still not as easily accessible for women as it is for
men. This applies to Morocco as well. 379
¶95
All in all, “early reformer”380 Tunisia comes out best when looking at the freedom
of women to enter into marriage, their obligations during marriage, access to divorce and
their position upon divorce. 381 However, both Tunisia and Egypt make a distinction
between men and women in marital age that could negate much of the positive
developments in the law, as it constitutes an inequality in bargaining power with respect
to the marriage contract. 382 All three countries no longer mention the wife’s duty of
obedience, which is a positive development, but the possible restrictions that can be
placed on the wife’s movement by forbidding her to work, as can be done under Egyptian
family law, are negative. 383
¶96
The fact that the refo rms are moving in the right direction does not mean that the
codes as they stand – in particular those of Egypt and Morocco – do not leave much to be
desired. Tunisia was right to abolish polygamy completely since the reasons why it was
encouraged are no longer valid today. 384 The restriction placed on it by the Moroccan

374

Bordat & Kouzi, supra note 280.
Id.
376
See supra Part IV.C.
377
See supra Part IV.B; see also Bordat & Kouzi, supra note 280.
378
El-Komsan, supra note 265.
379
See M OROCCAN FAMILY CODE OF 2004, supra note 279, at art. 98.
380
Brandt & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 128.
381
See supra Part IV.C.
382
See supra note 351 and accompanying text.
383
W OMEN ’S RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW , supra note 226, at 70-71; M OROCCAN FAMILY CODE OF
2004, supra note 279, at art. 51; TUNISIAN CODE OF PERSONAL STATUS, supra note 321, at art. 23.
384
See supra note 58.
375

211

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2007

code is commendable, but should be the prelude to abolishment. 385 Egypt should do the
same.
¶97
The Tunisian divorce arrangement can be a model for other countries. Both Egypt
and Morocco have increased the possibilities for a woman to obtain a divorce and
restricted the husband’s use of talaq, 386 but the systems for men and women remain
separate and disadvantageous for women. 387 As set out above, a separate but equal
doctrine does not appear to work.
¶98
It should be possible to amend the law and still adhere to the Quranic principle of
balance between the spouses. If awarding the wife equal footing when it comes to
freedom of movement during marriage, access to divorce, and right of custody of the
children is considered to distort the balance of mutual duties and obligations, an option
could be created for the wife to “counterbalance” her increased independence by, for
example, requiring her to contribute to the household expenses if she goes out to work.
Such a regulation could leave ample room for the traditional arrangement the drafters of
the original codes had in mind, in which the wife took care of the house and the family
and the husband provided her with the money to do so. But it could also allow for a
somewhat more modern arrangement in which both spouses work and contribute to the
household costs according to their ability. This should be provided solely as an option,
not a general rule; there can be many reasons why a woman would choose not to work, 388
but should she want to, she should be able to make that choice. Tunisia’s and Morocco’s
provisions on the woman’s obligation to contribute financially if she has the means to do
so allude to this, 389 and it is an idea that should be taken into consideration in future law
reforms.
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